In September 1961, however, a major appraisal made by New Delhi's
Intelligence Bureau concluded that the Chinese did not challenge Indian outposts once they had been established, and on 2 November Nehru held a meeting with his Defence Minister and close confidant, Krishna Menon, and senior military officers, at which a firm decision was taken to advance and establish new posts in Ladakh. Orders were issued that gave the cautious commander of the western region no further grounds for delay. Even in the eastern sector, along the border between Tibet and India's North-East
Frontier Agency (NEF A), which was quiescent at the time, the existing prohibition on operations within 3 km. of the frontier was lifted, and the local commander was ordered to 'plug the gaps' with a 'systematic advance' towards the Indian-claimed McMahon Line.
Nehru was apparently unaware of the parlous condition of India's forces on the border, and certainly unwilling to contemplate emergency purchases of arms from abroad, but his policy was anyway posited on the belief that war between India and China was unthinkable, which was in turn based on the assumption that the Chinese would not launch a major attack.9 This latter misapprehension would be bolstered as late as September 1962 by Soviet advice to the same effect.10 Indian misperceptions were compounded by the lack of any systematic attempt by the New Delhi intelligence community to analyze Chinese domestic and diplomatic developments. Instead, reliance was placed on CIA briefings, newspaper accounts, and, presumably, despatches from the Indian embassy in Beijing about China's economic crisis, its split with the Soviet Union, and the threat of invasion from Taiwan. India concluded that the Chinese were too hard pressed to contemplate any major hostilities.11 Moreover, the swift victory of the Indian forces in the takeover of the Portuguese colony of Goa in December 1961 produced a false euphoria in which it was easy to gloss over the 'military inadequacies' exposed by that relatively simple operation.12
In the first half of 1962, the Indian forces in Ladakh were gradually reinforced, attaining a strength of four battalions, broken down into sixty posts and patrols, but were still outnumbered five to one and greatly outgunned. In NEF A, new posts were established, higher up the mountain slopes, closer to the Tibetan border. In both sectors, these moves were made despite a continuing lack of adequate logistical support, at the insistence of the Chief of General Staff, B. M. Kaul. Indian troops penetrated its lines, a Chinese unit had first to issue a warning and try to push them into retreating; if this did not work, it had then to confiscate their weapons according to international custom, and after an explanation, return their weapons and allow them to leave.14 All easier said than done, was probably the comment of the average PLA platoon commander, but there was a reason for Chinese caution.
In May-June 1962, the main concern in Beijing was over the threat of an the territory claimed by India, but again, it was on the Tibet side of the McMahon Line. In New Delhi, the area was seen as indisputably Indian; in Beijing, it was claimed as Chinese, but recognized as disputed territory and thus subject to negotiation as part of a formal boundary delimitation.49
On 13 September, the Chinese delivered two notes which took strong lines.
One protested recent incidents in the western sector, Warning that 'he who plays with fire will eventually be consumed by fire'.5OThe other, part of the ongoing correspondence about the border situation in general, accused
India of 'persisting in advancing into Chinese territory, changing the status quo by force and aggravating the border tension', and of using negotiation as a cover for 'nibbling Chinese territory', but proposed that there should be talks, starting on 15 October. 51 On 16 September, a Chinese note protested the establishment of the Indian post at Dhola, again describing this as part of India's 'systematic nibbling activities' which 'fully reveal how ambitious the Indian side's aggressive designs are'.52 An Indian note of 19
September noted Beijing's 'undiplomatic language' and 'threats of force', countered that it was the Chinese who were attempting to alter the status quo by 'unilateral action and aggressive activities', but accepted the idea of talks starting on 15 October 'to define measures to restore the status quo in the Western Sector which has been altered by force in the last few years and to remove the current tensions in that area'.53
Although both sides professed a willingness to talk, they differed considerably on the topics they were willing to discuss. More crucially, while Wu's heart sank, presumably because he knew the furore this would cause.
Nevertheless, he quickly had the statement translated into Russian and
Hungarian and devised a plan to prevent his being stopped in mid-protest. press. Realizing that this would provoke an enormous row if followed rigidly, the East German excused China and Czechoslovakia-Novotny had not come-from the rule. Other parties had to be content with regional spokesmen: the Cubans spoke for Latin America, the Japanese for Asia.
This meant that pro-Chinese parties like the North Koreans and the Indonesians could not speak, and their messages were in fact not published in the East German press.131 Worse still, in his opening report the East German party leader, Walter Ulbricht, blamed the Chinese for abandoning peaceful coexistence on the Sino-Indian border.
In what seems to have been a variation of the old 'bad cop/good cap' routine, Khrushchev followed up Ulbricht's hatchet job with a partially conciliatory speech, perhaps another attempt to corral the Chinese delegation and to avert a Prague-type fiasco. He spent considerable time justifying Soviet behaviour in the missile crisis on the lines he later adopted in his memoirs, and went on to deride the Chinese, though without naming them, for the polemics the y had issued on this subject:
Some people who consider themselves Marxists opine that the way to combat imperialism is not, above aIl, by building up the socialist countries' economic strength-that tangible factor with which our enemies reckon; no, they have invented a new method of doing it, probably the cheapest ever known. This method, you see, does not depend on a country's economic level, it does not depend on the quality and quantity of armaments; it consists in nothing but abuse. These people imagine that to engage in endless swearing and cursing at imperialism is to do what will best help the socialist countries. This is a sort of voodoo belief in the power of curses and incantations.132
Khrushchev proposed that, from now on, public intra-party debates should cease, that within their own ranks parties should desist from criticizing fraternal parties, and that the Albanians should abandon their mistaken viewpoints and return to the large and fraternal socialist family. The East Germans immediately supported this 'correct advice', and demanded to know the Chinese delegation's response.
Wu and his colleagues reasoned that, despite the heated atmosphere, Khrushchev had not yet decided on precipitating a split and anyway did not want to assume the responsibility for one-which probably mirrored Mao's position, though Wu did not comment on that-and so had put up a smokescreen to deceive middle-of-the road foreign communists. This placed the Chinese in a dilemma: if they did not fall in with Khrushchev's suggestion, they would be seen as the splitters, but if they agreed to it, they would loge the opportunity of making their case. New instructions arrived from Beijing along with the text of the CCP's official greeting. The latter was translated and printed, and all available Chinese officials were impressed into distributing copies in an effort to evade the anticipated East German refusal to publish it. On 18 January, with Khrushchev pointedly absent, Wu
Xiuquan went to the podium to read it out. The Chinese line was that everyone should pay more attention to deeds than to words, in order to be able to distinguish between false unification and actual splitting. Wu also expressed 'extreme regret' that the host party had chosen to use their congress as the occasion for attacking a fraternal party.
Provoked by Wu's criticisms of Yugoslavia, whose representatives were at the congress, the East German chairman repeatedly tried to cut Wu notwithstanding, the CCP and the CPSU would sit down together in one last, futile effort to resolve their differences.
